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RECENTqCASES
Brewery's Bad Frog Was Set Free After
Giving New York "The Finger"
by Irene Kowalczyk
In Bad Frog Brewery, Inc., v.
N.Y State Liquor Authority, 134
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1998), the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment, which held in
favor of the New York State Liquor
Authority's ("NYSLA" or
"Authority") prohibition of Bad
Frog Brewery, Inc.'s ("Bad Frog")
offensive beer labels. The Second
Circuit held that NYSLA
unlawfully rejected Bad Frog's
application for approval of its beer
labels, and held that the labels were
protected as commercial speech
under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
Bad Frog Gets Disciplined
Bad Frog, a Michigan
corporation, manufactures and
markets alcoholic beverages
throughout the United States. In the
marketing of several beer products,
the company developed labels for its
bottles depicting a frog holding up
its four-fingered hand, with the
second finger raised and the other
fingers curled. The gesture is easily
recognized as "giving the finger."
The labels also display slogans such
as "He just don't care," "An
amphibian with an attitude," and
"The beer so good ... it's bad."
The Federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms and at least
fifteen states have approved the
labels for use. However, three states
have rejected the labels. In May
1996, Bad Frog's distributor
attempted to secure permission from
NYSLA to use the labels on its beer
products. Two months later,
NYSLA rejected Bad Frog's
application for brand label approval
and registration pursuant to § 107-
a(4)(a) of New York's Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law. NYSLA
stated that the slogan, "He's mean,
green, and obscene," rendered the
entire label obscene. In August of
1996, Bad Frog resubmitted its
application to NYSLA, replacing
the offensive slogan with the
phrase, "Turning bad into good." In
both applications, Bad Frog claimed
that the frog's gesture implied "I
want a Bad Frog beer" and was
intended to promote peace,
solidarity, and good will.
One month later, NYSLA
rejected Bad Frog's second
application, stating that the
company's explanation of the frog's
gesture was "ludicrous and
disingenuous." The Authority also
found that the slogan "He just don't
care" and the gesture, which
appeared near the label's health
warning, jointly act to "foster a
defiance" to the warning and found
that the label itself "encourages
combative behavior." NYSLA also
expressed concerns about minors'
exposure to the label in grocery
stores and its potential to entice
minors to consume alcohol.
Furthermore, NYSLA stated that
"giving the finger" was an obscene
gesture meaning "Fuck You" or "Up
Yours," and was known to provoke
violence. NYSLA stated that
approving the label "would not be
conducive to proper regulation and
control and would tend to adversely
affect the health, safety and welfare
of the People of the State of New
York."
District Court Told Bad Frog
to Lose the Attitude
In October 1996, Bad Frog filed
the present action in the district
court, seeking to prevent NYSLA
from barring the sale of Bad Frog
beer under the disputed labels. The
district court denied the motion for
a preliminary injunction in
December, finding that Bad Frog
had not demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits. In July
1997, the court granted summary
judgment for NYSLA, holding that
NYSLA's decision to reject the
labels "appeared to be a permissible
restriction on commercial speech"
under Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission ofN.Y, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). In addition, the court found
that the Eleventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution seemed
to bar Bad Frog's state law claims.
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It therefore declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims.
Bad Frog Fights Back on
Appeal
On appeal, Bad Frog raised a
First Amendment challenge to
NYSLA's decision to reject its label
application, and several state law
claims against NYSLA
commissioners in their individual
capacities. The brewery argued that
the labels did not constitute
commercial speech, but merely
communicated a joke, and therefore
should enjoy full First Amendment
protection. NYSLA, on the other
hand, contended that although the
labels were entitled to some
protection under the First
Amendment, they should have been
evaluated by the reduced standards
afforded to commercial speech.
The Second Circuit reviewed a
line of United States Supreme Court
decisions to determine whether Bad
Frog's labels constituted
commercial speech, entitling them
to only reduced First Amendment
protection. The court then applied
the Supreme Court's Central
Hudson test to determine the
governmental restrictions on
commercial speech. Although the
court recognized the two substantial
state interests that NYSLA raised to
support its rejection of Bad Frog's
labels, it found that NYSLA's
prohibition of the beer labels did not
directly advance the asserted state
interests. Furthermore, the court
determined that the ban on the
labels was more extensive than
necessary to further the state
interests. The court concluded that
the brewery's First Amendment
challenge to the State's prohibition
of its beer labels entitled the
brewery to injunctive relief.
Bad Frog's Federal Claims
The court first examined whether
it should abstain from deciding the
federal law claims until the state
courts had ruled on the state law
claims. These state claims
concerned regulations on the
marketing and labeling of alcoholic
beverages, enacted by NYSLA
under authority granted by New
York's Alcoholic Beverage Control
Law. According to the regulations,
NYSLA could ban signage
displaying "any statement, design,
device, matter, or representation
which is obscene or indecent or
which is obnoxious or offensive to
the commonly and generally
standard of fitness and good taste"
inside stores and taverns licensed to
sell alcohol. N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. ix § 83.3 (1996). The
regulations also allowed NYSLA to
prohibit alcoholic beverage labels
that could deceive the consumer.
The court found that NYSLA's
actions raised several undecided
state law issues. It noted that the
Pullman abstention doctrine could
be appropriate because Bad Frog's
federal constitutional claim turned
on an uncertain area of state law.
See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941). Under the
Pullman abstention doctrine, a
federal court may exercise its
discretion to restrain from deciding
the case until a state court interprets
an unclear question of state law.
The federal court retains
jurisdiction over the case, pending a
prompt state court determination.
Abstention is warranted if there is
substantial uncertainty as to the
meaning of a state law, and there is
reasonable probability that the state
court's clarification of the law
would negate the need for a federal
constitutional ruling.
Although a state court decision
on the extent of NYSLA's authority
to promulgate regulations might
render a ruling on Bad Frog's First
Amendment claim by the federal
court unnecessary, the Second
Circuit has held that abstention
should only be applied in rare and
unique cases. Pullman abstention is
inappropriate for First Amendment
claims if the allegedly overbroad
state statute is challenged facially
for inhibiting protected speech. In
this case, the appellate court found
that abstention was even less
appropriate because Bad Frog
challenged the state statute's ban on
a specific example of speech.
Therefore, the court declined to
abstain from deciding the present
case because of the substantial delay
Bad Frog would experience if forced
to resolve its state law issues in a
state forum before bringing its
federal claims in federal court.
Beer Labels Constituted
Commercial Speech
After finding the case
inappropriate for Pullman
abstention, the court considered
whether Bad Frog's beer labels
constituted commercial or
noncommercial speech. If the labels
constituted noncommercial speech,
they would receive full First
Amendment protection. However, if
the labels attempted to impart
commercial information, they would
be assessed under the reduced
standards for commercial speech.
Bad Frog argued that the beer labels
attempted to convey a joke rather
than commercial information, and
therefore deserved full First
Amendment protection. NYSLA, on
the other hand, contended that the
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labels should receive only limited
protection under the First
Amendment as commercial speech.
The court reviewed a line of
United States Supreme Court cases,
which discussed the forms of
commercial speech that were
protected under the First
Amendment. The court noted that
past decisions had not clearly
resolved the issue, and a
considerable degree of uncertainty
remained regarding the degree of
protection afforded to commercial
speech that does not convey
information. Prior Supreme Court
cases held that the First
Amendment did not protect
commercial speech, including
advertisements which merely
proposed a commercial transaction.
Subsequent cases created
uncertainty as to the forms of
commercial speech that were
entitled to protection.
Finally, in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976), the Court held that speech
which merely suggested a
commercial transaction did enjoy
some First Amendment protection.
Furthermore, the Court had
occasion to address whether speech
conveying minimal commercial
information received any protection.
In Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1
(1979), the Court did not grant full
First Amendment protection to a
company trade name. Although the
trade name suggested a commercial
transaction and was a form of
commercial speech, the trade name
did not communicate information
about the product until consumers
attached meaning to it through
brand association.
In analyzing the Supreme Court
cases, the court in the present case
determined that it was unclear
whether Friedman intended to
remove trademarks from the types
of commercial information
protected by the First Amendment.
Since Friedman, the Supreme Court
has not expressly clarified whether
logos and slogans, which convey no
information but propose a
commercial transaction, are
protected.
To resolve the uncertainty in the
case at hand, the Second Circuit
reviewed Posadas De Puerto Rico
Association v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328 (1986), in which casino
advertising constituted commercial
speech. In that case, instead of
analyzing whether the
advertisements conveyed
commercial information, the Court
examined whether the
advertisements proposing a
commercial transaction were
allowed First Amendment
protection. In its analysis, the Court
applied the Central Hudson test for
commercial speech protection.
The court in the present case
found that the Posadas opinion
supported the grant of limited First
Amendment protection to
trademarks. The court determined
that the minimal information on
Bad Frog's labels proposed a
commercial transaction, and served
to identify the beer as a product of
the brewery, similar to a trademark.
Therefore, the court found that the
labels constituted commercial
speech and should receive reduced
First Amendment protection.
Bad Frog's final argument in
favor of full protection was that its
labels combined inseparable
elements of commercial and
noncommercial speech. According
to the brewery, the labels proposed
not only a commercial transaction,
but also they imparted a political or
social commentary. Bad Frog
argued that the court should have
treated the entire label as fully-
protected speech because the
noncommercial message could not
have been separated from the
commercial speech.
The court rejected Bad Frog's
argument, finding that the label's
minimal amount of social
commentary did not convert its
commercial message into
noncommercial speech. The court
looked to Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983),
in which the Supreme Court used
three factors in distinguishing
between commercial and
noncommercial speech: (1) whether
the speech is an advertisement; (2)
whether the speech refers to a
particular product; and (3) whether
there is an economic motive behind
the speech. The Court held that
although none of the factors were
definitive, speech which
incorporated all three factors was
probably commercial. Finding all of
the factors present in Bad Frog's
labels, the court in the present case
determined that the labels
constituted commercial speech
entitled to reduced First
Amendment protection.
Frog Passed the Central
Hudson Test
In analyzing NYSLA's rejection
of the beer labels, the court applied
the commercial speech standards set
forth by the Supreme Court in
Central Hudson. In that case, the
Court developed a four-part test to
determine whether commercial
speech was protected by the First
Amendment. First, the speech must
concern "lawful activity and not be
misleading." Next, the asserted state
interest must be substantial. The
court then must determine whether
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the governmental restriction directly
advances the substantial state
interest. Finally, the regulation of
speech should be narrowly tailored
to meet the governmental interest,
and may not be "more extensive
than is necessary to serve that
interest." Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 566.
The Second Circuit agreed with
the district court that the labels
satisfied the initial inquiry of
Central Hudson because the
consumption of alcohol was legal
and the advertising labels were not
deceptive. Furthermore, NYSLA
satisfied the second prong by
advancing two substantial state
interests to support its decision to
reject Bad Frog's labels. NYSLA
claimed that the State had an
interest in "protecting children from
vulgar and profane advertising,"
and "in acting consistently to
promote temperance." The court
agreed with the district court that
these two interests were substantial
under the Central Hudson analysis.
Under the third prong of the
Central Hudson inquiry, the court
analyzed whether the prohibition of
Bad Frog's labels directly advanced
the two State interests. While the
court acknowledged that a complete
governmental ban on "vulgar and
profane advertising" throughout
New York was not necessary to
survive the analysis, it stated that a
single prohibition making a limited
contribution to further the state's
interest would not be material.
The court disagreed with the
district court's analysis of the third
prong. The lower court had adopted
a narrow view, merely requiring
NYSLA to prove that the ban on
Bad Frog's labels would limit the
exposure of children to the vulgar
display on the label. The court of
appeals, however, stated that in
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order for NYSLA to demonstrate
that it was materially advancing the
asserted state interest in protecting
children from obscenity, the state,
as a whole, must attack the problem
with substantial effort. Thus, the
government must demonstrate that
its ban on Bad Frog's labels was
part of a substantial effort to shield
children from vulgar displays.
The court noted that vulgar
displays, such as comic books, were
widespread throughout
contemporary society, but there was
minimal governmental regulation
limiting children's exposure to
vulgarity. Although NYSLA itself
only possessed limited power to ban
alcohol marketing schemes
displaying vulgarity, the state, as a
whole, did not attempt to shield
children from vulgar displays in
other realms. The court stated that:
[i]f New York decides to
make a substantial effort to
insulate children from vulgar
displays in some significant
sphere of activity, at least with
respect to materials likely to be
seen by children, NYSLA's
label prohibition might well be
found to make a justifiable
contribution to the material
advancement of such an effort,
but its currently isolated
response to the perceived
problem, applicable only to
labels on a product that
children cannot purchase, does
not suffice.
Thus, the court rejected the
district court's finding that
NYSLA's prohibition of Bad Frog's
label materially advanced the
substantial state interest in
protecting children from profane
advertising.
Next, the court examined
NYSLA's second asserted state
interest, the promotion of
temperance. The State argued that
the insulting gesture and the slogan
"He just don't care," placed in close
proximity to the Surgeon General's
health warning, encouraged
consumers to ignore the health
warning. In addition, the State
contended that the labels would
entice minors to defy authority and
illegally consume alcohol. The
court, however, found the
arguments speculative. Under the
Central Hudson framework, the
State did not satisfy the third
criterion because it failed to
establish that the ban on Bad Frog's
labels materially advanced the
government's interest in
temperance.
Finally, the court only examined
whether NYSLA's ban on the labels
was narrowly tailored to serve the
state's interest in shielding children
from displays of vulgarity. It found
that complete prohibition of Bad
Frog's labels was more extensive
than necessary to advance the
asserted governmental interest. In
rejecting the district court's finding
of narrow tailoring, the court
emphasized the availability of
numerous alternatives to a complete
ban on the labels. The court was
persuaded by Bad Frog's
suggestions that it could refrain
from over-the-air advertising and
billboard displays and limit its
marketing to point-of-sale locations.
In addition, Bad Frog offered to
segregate its beer products in
grocery stores and convenience
stores to limit children's exposure to
the label. The court found that
NYSLA failed to consider these less
restrictive alternatives to a complete
prohibition of Bad Frog's labels,
and therefore, did not withstand the
final criterion.
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Due to the length of time that
NYSLA's unconstitutional ban on
Bad Frog's labels had been in effect,
the court directed the district court
to enjoin NYSLA from rejecting the
company's label application.
However, the court denied Bad
Frog's claims for damages against
the three NYSLA commissioners
because it found that the
commissioners' decision to reject
Bad Frog's application was not
unreasonable in light of the district
court's findings. Therefore, the
NYSLA commissioners were
entitled to qualified immunity.
Bad Frog's State Law Claims
Bad Frog raised several state law
claims against the NYSLA
commissioners in their individual
capacities under the New York State
Constitution and the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law. In denying
Bad Frog's request for a preliminary
injunction, the district court found
that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the claims. In its opinion
granting summary judgment in
favor of NYSLA and dismissing
Bad Frog's federal claims, the
district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). The appellate court,
disagreeing with the district court,
found that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar all of Bad
Frog's state law claims. However,
due to the numerous novel and
complex state law issues raised, the
court of appeals declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
Bad Frog Hits the Shelves
With Finger Held High
In sum, Bad Frog's beer labels
enjoy commercial speech protection
under the First Amendment. Under
the Central Hudson framework, the
State unconstitutionally banned the
brewery's labels. Although the
government's interests in insulating
children from vulgarity and
promoting tolerance were
substantial, the prohibition on Bad
Frog's labels did not materially
advance these interests.
Furthermore, the complete ban on
the labels was more extensive than
necessary to accomplish the state's
interests. Therefore, the Second
Circuit reversed the grant of
summary judgment in favor of
NYSLA, and directed the district
court to enjoin NYSLA from
prohibiting Bad Frog's labels.
Court Established Accrual Rule for Keyboard Users
Afflicted with Repetitive Stress Injury
By Michael J. Calhoun
In Blanco v. American
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 689
N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1997), the Court
of Appeals of New York ruled on a
certified question that the cause of
action for computer keyboard users
who suffer from repetitive stress
injury ("RSI') accrues at the onset
of the user's symptoms or latest use
of the keyboard, whichever occurred
first.
Common Issues Raised By
Various Repetitive Stress
Injury Cases
RSI is a latent injury affecting
musculo-skeletal tissue. Activities
that involve repeated movements
and exertions of musculo-skeletal
tissue, such as playing video games
or operating a jackhammer, cause
RSI. Recently, however, many
computer keyboard users have been
inflicted by this disorder. Carpel
tunnel syndrome, the predominant
type of RSI involves "compression
of the median nerve as it passes
through the wrist between the flexor
tendons and the transverse carpal
tunnel ligament." Recent
widespread use of computer
keyboards accounts for the
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